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Abstract 
In China’s present economic development, factor misallocation and labor’s low income-share both are 
important and interrelated, with factor misallocation being an important reason for the decline in 
China’s labor income-share. Theoretical modeling demonstrates that if capital-labor is substitutable, 
the factor misallocation will lead to a decline in labor income-share. Empirical studies, using 
2001-2013 provincial panel data show that factor misallocation significantly reduces labor 
income-share, even after controlling for other factors that affect the labor-share. The conclusion is both 
significant and robust. Therefore, economic policy which optimizes factor allocation will improve 
labor’s income-share. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the mid-1990s, labor’s income-share of China’s national income has been continuously declining 
in the primary distribution (Wei, Dong, & Zhao, 2012; Wang et al., 2012). In 1996, the share of labor 
compensation in China’s GDP was 0.5145, falling to 0.3974 in 2007, a decrease of 0.1171; In 2012, 
workers’ compensation share was 0.4559 and the overall decline from1996 to 2012 was 0.0586 (Note 
1). China’s labor share is about 15 to 20 percentage points lower than OECD averages, while China’s 
labor income-share is on average 4 percentage points lower (Li, 2013). 
Labor income is the main source of income for China’s residents. For low-income families, labor 
income is often the sole form of income (Note 2). Declining labor income-share means income growth 
falls behind macroeconomic growth, which leads to slow consumption growth, reduces aggregate 
demand and negatively influences sustainable economic development (Li, 2010; Wang, 2014). For 
these reasons it is significant to study changes in national labor income-share to improve the living 
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standards of Chinese citizens, optimize economic structures and achieve sustainable economic 
development. 
However, due to the household registration system (hukou)—an institutional remnant of the planned 
economy which limits freedom of movement and determines access to government services; the land 
property rights system; local protectionism; weak rule of law; and financial repression and deposit 
interest rate controls, among other reasons, there are still strong factor segmentations (Yin & Cai, 2001; 
Shi & Ma, 2006) (Note 3). Different levels of factor segmentation among regions in China means 
factor flows between different economic areas incur higher costs. This results in suboptimal allocation 
of capital and labor, and results in large differences in per capita capital stock. According to our data 
calculations, the Gini coefficient of per capita capital among Chinese provinces reached 0.42 in 2010. 
Because differences in capital stock per capita lead to differences in marginal productivity, capital 
income-share and labor income-share are different, meaning factor misallocation has an impact on the 
labor-share. 
Previous studies have paid little attention to factor misallocation and changes in labor-share. Because 
Western economies have more sophisticated market-oriented institutions, costs of factor mobility 
(capital, labor, land, technology) are low, and factors are often able to achieve optimum configurations. 
Therefore, there is relatively little foreign literature on labor income-share from the perspective off act 
or misallocation (i.e., non-perfectly competitive factor markets hypothesis). There has been limited 
research in the area since Nicholas Kaldor (1961). Recent works include Bentolila and Saint-Paul 
(2003), Askenazy (2005), Jayadev (2007), Kabaca (2011), and so on. Domestic scholars who study the 
labor-share mainly use Chinese macro and micro data for empirical analysis (Luo & Zhang, 2009; Bai 
& Qian, 2009; Huang & Xu, 2009; Li et al., 2010; Wei et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012). The use of 
macro data empirical studies suggest that changes in the industrial structure, technological progress, 
increasing globalization, age-related changes in the demographic structure, international trade and other 
factors have led to the decline of China’s labor income-share (Luo & Zhang, 2009; Bai & Qian, 2010; 
Shao & Huang, 2020; Fang, 2011; Luo & Chen, 2012; Wei et al., 2013). Empirical studies using 
micro-data suggest that foreign investment, ownership structure, financial constraints, political 
relations, and trade union organization are important factors in the impact of China’s labor 
income-share. However, none of these studies includes scope for the study of factor misallocation. 
Existing literature has neglected to study labor income-share from the perspective of capital 
misallocation. This is likely not only for lack of a theoretical mechanism, but because the effect itself is 
difficult to observe. This paper attempts to analysis the reasons for China’s low labor income-share 
from the perspective of factor misallocation. We use theoretical models and empirical analysis to show 
that factor misallocation causes low labor income-share in China. Compared with existing studies, the 
falling labor income-share caused by factor misallocation demonstrates a new perspective and the study 
also has some practical significance, specifically that market integration through optimizing the 
allocation of resources will help improve China’s labor income-share. 
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2. Theoretical Model 
Considering a product of the economy, both for capital goods and consumer goods. Market economy i 
is perfectly competitive, and there is no technical change, in which the total capital stock is Ki, the 
amount of labor is Li, the production function  𝑌𝑖 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑖 , 𝐿𝑖)  is the second order differentiable with 
constant returns to scale. Per capita output is  𝑦𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖 𝐿𝑖⁄ , per capita capital stock (capital intensive 
degree)  𝑘𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖/𝐿𝑖 . Because of constant scale returns, the per capita output function is:  𝑦𝑖 =
𝐹(𝐾𝑖 𝐿𝑖⁄ , 1) = 𝑓(𝑘𝑖). 
Assume that the price level of output can be normalized to 1, in order to simplify the analysis, assume 
that the capital depreciation rate is 0, vendors produce many products to maximize their profits by 
choosing how much capital and labor to input. That is  max𝐾𝑖,𝐿𝑖 𝐹(𝐾𝑖 , 𝐿𝑖) − 𝑟𝑖𝐾𝑖 − 𝜔𝑖𝐿𝑖 where 𝑟𝑖 is 
the rate of capital return, 𝜔𝑖 is wages (labor income). Because the regional market is perfectly 
competitive, manufacturers’ maximize profits is 0, the return on capital is 𝑟𝑖 = 𝑓
′(𝑘𝑖), remuneration is
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑘𝑖) − 𝑘𝑖𝑓
′(𝑘𝑖) and family labor income share is  𝑒𝑖 = 1 − 𝑘𝑖𝑓
′(𝑘𝑖) 𝑓(𝑘𝑖)⁄ . 
Assume homogeneous manufacturers use CES production technology, the production function is then: 
𝑌𝑖 = A[α𝐾𝑖
(σ−1)/σ + (1 − α)𝐿𝑖
(σ−1)/σ]σ/(σ−1) 
Where A > 0 is total factor productivity simply because we only study the impact of capital 
accumulation and capital differences in labor income-share. Therefore, the model assumes the same 
TFP in different regions; 0 < α <1 is a constant; σ =
d(𝐾𝑖/𝐿𝑖)/(𝐾𝑖/𝐿𝑖)
d(𝜔𝑖 𝑟𝑖⁄ )/(𝜔𝑖/𝑟𝑖)
> 0 is the capital-labor substitution 
elasticity. When σ > 1, CES production function is the Cobb-Douglas functions. 
Per capita output is easily obtained: 
                yi = A[ ki
([   ap + (1  apσ/(σ−1) 
Rate of capita return: 
                    𝑟𝑖 = Aα[α𝑘𝑖
(σ−1)/σ + (1 − α)]1/(σ−1)𝑘𝑖
−1/σ
 
Remuneration: 
   𝜔𝑖 = (1 − α)A[α𝑘𝑖
(σ−1)/σ + (1 − α)]1/(σ−1) 
Labor income share 
𝑒𝑖 = (1 − α)[α𝑘𝑖
(σ−1)/σ + (1 − α)]−1                       (1) 
Further getting: 
𝜔𝑖 = (1 − α)A
1−1/σ𝑦𝑖
1 σ⁄ = 𝐵𝑦𝑖
1 σ⁄  
𝑒𝑖 = B𝑦𝑖
1 σ⁄ −1                                   (2) 
According to (1), it is easy to get the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: When the elasticity of substitution of capital-labor σ > 1, this means that capital and 
labor are in a substitutable relationship, ∂𝑒𝑖/𝜕𝑘𝑖 < 0. 
Proof: 
∂𝑒𝑖
𝜕𝑘𝑖
= −α(1 − α)[α𝑘𝑖
(σ−1)/σ + (1 − α)]−2𝑘𝑖
−1/σ < 0 
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That is, the accumulation of capital will reduce an individual labor income-share in a perfectly 
competitive market. Here we examine results in an imperfectly competitive market, namely the case 
where elements of market segmentation exist. 
According to neoclassical economic theory, optimal factor allocation will be achieved in a fully 
competitive market. If total factor productivity is the same, aspects on labor income-share in different 
regions will tend to be equal. Since the factor incomes depends on the marginal output of factors, it 
means that the capital intensity of different areas should smooth towards uniformity to achieve the 
optimal allocation of resources. Therefore, if the degree of capital intensity is different in different 
areas, we can attribute this to factor misallocation. Learning from the most commonly used measure of 
an income inequality index, this article uses the Gini coefficient of per capita capital or “factor 
misallocation coefficient” (Gk) to measure factor misallocation. It ranges [0,1] with Gk = 0 indicating 
there is no factor mismatch, and Gk = 1 indicating the most serious factor misallocation. 
Set Total Factor Productivity and labor of N regions as the same number, k = (∑ 𝑘𝑖
N
i=1 )/N as a global 
per capita capital stock, 𝑘𝑖( 𝑖 = 1,2, 𝑔𝑁) as the region i per capita capital stock, assuming 𝑘1 < 𝑘2 <
⋯ < 𝑘𝑁. 
Set capital stock per capita of N regions to obey classical Pareto distribution, the per capital distribution 
of the Lorenz curve (Wang et al., 2012; Wang & Wu, 2013) is: 𝐿(𝑝) = 1 − (1 − 𝑝)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘. 
𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘𝑁 [𝐿 (
𝑖
𝑁
) − 𝐿 (
𝑖 − 1
𝑁
)] = 𝑘𝑁 [(1 −
𝑖 − 1
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘 − (1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘] 
According to the definition of the Lorenz curve, the per capita capital in region i is: 
𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘𝑁 [𝐿 (
𝑖
𝑁
) − 𝐿 (
𝑖 − 1
𝑁
)] = 𝑘𝑁 [(1 −
𝑖 − 1
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘 − (1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘] 
Set per capita income in the region i as yi, and per capita income of each region to obey classical Pareto 
distribution. The Gini coefficient is Gy, The per capita income in all regions is y, then: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑁 [(1 −
𝑖 − 1
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑦
1+𝐺𝑦 − (1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑦
1+𝐺𝑦] 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑘𝑖) = 𝑓 (𝑘𝑁 [(1 −
𝑖 − 1
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘 − (1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘]) 
𝑦 =
1
𝑁
[∑ 𝑓(𝑘𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
] =
1
𝑁
[∑ 𝑓 (𝑘𝑁 [(1 −
𝑖 − 1
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘 − (1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘])
𝑁
𝑖=1
] 
We then get the following lemma: 
Lemma 1:
𝜕𝑦
∂k
> 0; Per capita capital increases, the greater the per capita income becomes. 
Proof:
𝜕𝑦
∂k
= ∑ {𝑓′ (𝑘𝑁 [(1 −
𝑖−1
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘 − (1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘]) [(1 −
𝑖−1
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘 − (1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘]}𝑁𝑖=1 > 0 
Lemma 2:
𝜕Gy
∂ym
> 0; The greater the factor mismatch coefficient is, the greater regional income 
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disparities become. 
Proof: 𝑦1 = 𝑦𝑁 [1 − (1 −
1
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑦
1+𝐺𝑦]，𝑦1 = 𝑓 (𝑘𝑁 [1 − (1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑘
1+𝐺𝑘]), then 
∂𝑦1
𝜕𝐺𝑦
< 0, 
∂𝑦1
𝜕𝐺𝑘
< 0, finally, 
𝜕Gy
∂yf
> 0. 
According to (1), we can get the national labor income share: 
𝑒 =
∑ 𝐵𝑦𝑖
1 𝜎⁄𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑁
= 𝐵(𝑦𝑁)1 𝜎⁄ −1 ∑ {[(1 −
𝑖 − 1
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑦
1+𝐺𝑦 − (1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑦
1+𝐺𝑦]}
1 𝜎⁄𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Then we can get propositions: 
Proposition 2: When σ > 1, 
∂h
∂h
 < 0; i.e., when capital-labor relations are substitutable, capital 
accumulation of the whole society is higher, then labor’s income-share will be lower. 
Proof:
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑦
= 𝐵(1 𝜎⁄ − 1)(𝑦𝑁)1 𝜎⁄ −2 ∑ {[(1 −
𝑖−1
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑦
1+𝐺𝑦 − (1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑦
1+𝐺𝑦]}
1 𝜎⁄
𝑁
𝑖=1  
Because σ > 1, so 
∂o
∂o
< 0. According to Lemma 2,
𝜕𝑦
∂k
> 0.Then:
∂h
∂h
=
∂h
∂h
∂h
∂h
< 0. 
Proposition 2 shows that the impact of capital deepening on labor’s income-share is the same 
irrespective of whether the market is perfectly competitive or segmented. 
Proposition 3: When σ > 1,
∂W
∂Wh
 < 0 , that is, when capital-labor is substitutable, the resource 
misallocation coefficient is higher, and the national labor income-share becomes lower. 
Proof: 
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝐺𝑦
=
−2𝐵(1 𝜎⁄ )(𝑦𝑁)1 𝜎−1⁄
(1+𝐺𝑦)
2 ∑ {[(1 =
𝑖−1
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑦
1+𝐺𝑦 − (1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑦
1+𝐺𝑦]
1 𝜎−1⁄
[(1 −
𝑖−1
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑦
1+𝐺𝑦𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 −
𝑖−1
𝑁
) −𝑁𝑖=1
(1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)
1−𝐺𝑦
1+𝐺𝑦𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 −
𝑖
𝑁
)]}  
Referring to Wang and Wu (2013), we have the proof of Proposition 3, 
when σ > 1, 
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝐺𝑦
< 0. 
According to Lemma 2 
𝜕Gy
∂yc
> 0, then 
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝐺𝑘
=
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝐺𝑦
𝜕𝐺𝑦
𝜕𝐺𝑘
< 0. 
Proposition 3 implies that when the substitution elasticity of labor and capital is greater than 1, the 
factor misallocation will reduce the national labor income-share. 
Propositions above show that influence direction of resources mismatch for the labor share depends on 
capital-labor substitution elasticity. For the estimated capital-labor substitution elasticity, Bentolina and 
Saint-Paul (2003) have shown that it is more than 1; while other research findings differ: Shao and 
Huang (2010) suggest that capital-labor substitution elasticity in Chinese industry is less than 1, Bai 
and Qian (2009) consider it close to 1; Luo and Zhang (2009) find it less than but close to 1; Li et al. 
(2010), Wang et al. (2012) suggest that it is more than 1. Overall, more studies suggest that 
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capital-labor substitution elasticity in China is greater than 1. The estimated results of this paper 
are1.33, which means that factor misallocation will reduce labor’s income-share. We provide 
confirmation in the following empirical analysis. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Econometric Models and Data 
We examine the impact of misallocated capital on labor’s income-share according to the above 
theoretic analysis. Our econometric model is set as follows: 
𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (*) 
Where, i denotes province, t is year, ui is sectional effect, εit is random error term. Explained variables 
LSit represents labor income-share; calculated indicators are for each provinces’ labor compensation 
share of GDP in their provinces. According to the above definition, it is proper to use the Gini 
coefficient of per capita capital. Due to data availability, we use provincial Gini coefficient of per capita 
GDP as a proxy variable which is calculated by per capita GDP at the county level (city) (Note 4); 
explanatory variables pKit is the real per capita capital stock. Referring to the method of Zhang et al. 
(2004) which uses perpetual inventory, 𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡/𝑃𝑡, where Kt represents the actual 
capital stock at the end of the t year, Kt-1 represents actual capital stock at the end of the previous year, 
It represents nominal investment of the year, Pt is the adjusted price index, δ represents the depreciation 
rate taken at 5 percent in this model, and then make K capita adjusted to get per capita capital stock of 
the provinces in each year; Xit act as control variables. Referring to (Wei et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2012) 
and data availability, this paper specifically selects control variables including average education 
attainment (pEDU), the ratio of direct foreign investment to GDP (FDI), the ratio of local public fiscal 
expenditure to GDP (GOV), and the ratio of capital-output (K/Y). 
We use provincial panel data from 2001 to 2013 from a total of 30 provinces (Note 5) (using combined 
data for Sichuan and Chongqing). The original database is from Wind data, China Statistical Yearbooks 
and provincial statistical yearbooks. All nominal data using a fixed base price index (2001 as the base 
period) are adjusted to the actual value, using Stata for data analysis. Table 1 is a statistical description 
of all variables; Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables; Table 3 
provides the inflation factor test values of the explanatory variables. It can be seen from the table that 
all demonstrate high tolerance and collinearity influences can be ignored. 
 
Table 1. Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
LS 390 0.458 0.070 0.311 0.738 
pK 373 1.884 1.725 0.140 10.94 
GINI 351 0.298 0.0759 0.150 0.556 
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pEDU 373 8.575 0.928 6.040 11.09 
FDI 390 0.028 0.0263 4.82e-06 0.146 
GOV 390 0.187 0.121 0.0772 0.851 
K/Y 373 1.411 0.966 0.227 4.441 
 
Table 2. Explanatory Variable Correlation Coefficient 
 pk gini pedu FDIs Gov KGs 
pK 1      
gini 0.2073 1.     
pEDU 0.2247 -0.0597 1    
FDI 0.3650 0.0024 0.2150 1   
GOV -0.5442 0.3039 -0.4771 -0.4199 1  
K/Y 0.7472 0.0147 -0.0277 0.0592 -0.5038 1 
 
Table 3. Explanatory Variables VIF 
Variable VIF SORTVIF Tolerance 
K 3.83 1.96 0.2610 
GINI 1.45 1.21 0.6886 
pEDU 1.65 1.29 0.6050 
FDI 1.57 1.25 0.6355 
GOV 2.98 1.73 0.3351 
K/Y 3.59 1.90 0.2784 
MeanVIF 2.51   
 
3.2 Results of Basic Regression Analysis 
We estimated the impact on labor income-share caused by factor misallocation using different methods. 
Firstly, we used an econometric model without adding any control variables, only considering two key 
variables (per capita capital and factor misallocation) which are in Table 3 columns 1-3 followed by 
fixed effects, random effects, and a hybrid sectional model estimation. The three methods obtain 
consistently that the influence coefficient of resource mismatch coefficient is significantly negative. 
Further, we added a series of control variables (pEdu, FDIs, GOV) to verify the robustness of the 
estimate shown in Table 3 columns 4-6. The regression results indicate that these control variables have 
the explanatory role of labor’s income-share, while the estimated coefficient of factor misallocation is 
significant in this study, without significant change. In order to verify the impact of the single 
coefficient of factor misallocation, we also use a common interpretation variable capital-output ratio 
(K/Y) instead of per capita pK to do the regression. The results are shown in Table 3 columns 7-9. The 
regression coefficient of the resources mismatch coefficient is still significant. 
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Table 4. Basic Regression Estimation Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Fe1 Re1 pOls1 Fe2 Re2 pOls2 Fe3 Re3 pOls3 
GINI -0.191** -0.196*** -0.177*** -0.140* -0.141** -0.200*** -0.232*** -0.234*** -0.293*** 
 (0.078) (0.068) (0.055) (0.064) (0.070) (0.064) (0.082) (0.072) (0.061) 
pK -0.030*** -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.024*** -0.018*** -0.010***    
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003)    
pEdu    -0.030** -0.030*** -0.017** -0.051*** -0.041*** -0.014* 
    (0.015) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) 
FDIs    -0.866** -0.241 0.004 -0.308 -0.369 -0.068 
    (0.412) (0.282) (0.196) (0.485) (0.291) (0.207) 
GOV    -0.629* -0.329** 0.005 -0.856*** -0.215* 0.215 
    (0.306) (0.131) (0.106) (0.276) (0.152) (0.119) 
KGs       -0.115** -0.015* 0.001 
       (0.054) (0.009) (0.006) 
_cons 0.574*** 0.555*** 0.535*** 0.914*** 0.837*** 0.681*** 1.256*** 0.924*** 0.635*** 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.017) (0.123) (0.085) (0.065) (0.129) (0.097) (0.078) 
N 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 
r2 0.293  0.203 0.358  0.239 0.270  0.193 
r2_w 0.293 0.287  0.358 0.346  0.270 0.224  
 
We then analyze the impact of the control variables on labor’s income-share, compared with the results 
from the existing literature. 
1) Human capital (average years of education) coefficients are significantly negative, which is contrary 
to the research of Wei et al. (2012). Generally speaking, if human capital measured in years of 
education (knowledge stock) is higher, wages in labor will be higher and labor’s income-share will be 
greater. However, when we correlate human capital and industry (manufacturing), the higher the human 
capital in the areas is, the higher the level of technology or quality of industry will be in these areas, so 
that the industries have higher regional labor productivity. According to Wei et al. (2013), if the 
capital-labor substitution elasticity is greater than 1, the growth rate of wages will reduce labor’s 
income-share, because labor productivity increases more. From this perspective, the negative impact of 
human capital on labor’s income-share can be explained. 
2) The estimated FDI coefficient is negative, but the significance level is not high. Only a fixed effects 
model is significant, indicating that the impact of FDI on labor income-share is uncertain. There is no 
clear conclusion in the previous research. Luo and Zhang (2009), Shao and Huang (2010) believe that 
foreign investment has a negative impact on labor income, but Xian and Yang (2009), Gorg, Strobl and 
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Walsh (2007) have opposing viewpoints; Wei et al. (2012) indicates that its impact is uncertain in the 
research. Overall, because the impact of FDI on labor’s income-share mechanism is too complex, the 
overall impact of the results is uncertain. 
3) The estimated coefficient of the government expenditure ratio to GDP (GOV) is mostly significantly 
negative, indicating that current Chinese government intervention in the economy will significantly 
reduce labor’s income-share, concurring with the results of Wei et al. (2012). However, the existing 
results are not entirely consistent. Luo and Zhang (2009) found that the use of provincial government 
budget data will help improve labor’s income-share, while Wang and Sheng (2010) found that study of 
the provincial data shows the impact of government spending on labor’s income-share is not significant. 
We believe that excessive government intervention in the economy is in favor of capital, but to the 
detriment of workers overall. 
4) Capital-output ratio (K/Y) of the estimated coefficient is negative, consistent with the coefficient of 
capital deepening (pk). The result of this study is also consistent with Bai and Qian (2010). Wei et al. 
(2013) which suggests that the current capital-labor relation in Chinais alternative rather than 
substitutable. 
3.3 Endogenous Discussion 
We mainly consider the impact of endogenous problems and abnormal sample points on the test results. 
We also used residents’ income Gini coefficient as a proxy variable of capital gaps into the model test. 
Firstly, endogeneity problems may arise when the explanatory variables and control variables have 
contemporaneous correlation with the residual error. We will replace the current variables with the 
lagged explanatory and control variables on the right regression equation. The model (4) is then 
re-estimated. The main results are shown in column 2 in Table 5. Due to a high correlation between the 
lagged and current variables, the results in Table 4 are still credible: the variation of factor 
misallocation coefficient on labor’s income-share has explanatory power, and the coefficients are 
negative. 
Secondly, considering the labor income share itself may be associated with the previous results in 
endogenous problems, we add the lag phase of LS of explained variables as explanatory variables 
based on the static model. The model turns to a dynamic panel model, namely: 
𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜌𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑝𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Finally, using the GMM two-stage system to estimate the model, the estimation results are shown in 
column 3 of Table 5. Considering AR (1) -P value is 0.012 by the first order autocorrelation test, the 
disturbance is free to first order autocorrelation, and the system GMM is effective. The p-value tested 
by Sargan is 0.323, thus accepting the null hypothesis of valid instrumental variables. Therefore, the 
instrumental variables used are reasonable. Estimated results using Generalized Method of Moments is 
that the regression coefficient of resources mismatch remains significantly negative. 
3.4 Robustness Test 
Our first robustness test considers the impact of the unusual geographic factors of China’s economy. 
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Due to distinctive regional features of China’s economic development, there are significant differences 
between remuneration indifferent regions of China. To test whether the results were affected by outliers, 
firstly we calculated the percentage of the urban labor income-share of all provinces at 5% and 95%, 
and then removed the samples which were below the 5th quantile and above the 95thquantile. On this 
basis, the remaining samples were estimated in fixed effect models. The results are shown in column 4 
of Table 5, which shows that the regression coefficient of factor misallocation is significantly negative 
and close to the previous results from the point of value. 
Our second robustness test uses the Gini coefficient as a proxy replacement variable. Previously, we 
use the Gini coefficient of per capita GDP as a proxy variable of the capital gap. For the further ensure 
robustness, we reused the Gini coefficient as a proxy variable, and then analyzed the impact of the 
resources mismatch coefficient on labor’s income-share. The estimation results are shown in column 5 
of Table 5. The variable GINI2 is based on Gini coefficients of the provinces. The results show that 
when we use the Gini coefficient as a proxy variable, the effect of the resource mismatch coefficient on 
labor’s income share is still significantly negative. 
 
Table 5. Robustness Analysis Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Fe2 Lag GMM Outliers GINI2 
GINI -0.140** -0.271** -0.152*** -0.135**  
 (0.064) (0.108) (0.058) (0.066)  
pK -0.024*** -0.031*** -0.004** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
pEdu -0.030** -0.036** -0.036*** -0.020 -0.032** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.004) (0.013) (0.014) 
FDIs -0.866** -1.454*** 0.078 -0.461 -0.190 
 (0.412) (0.457) (0.163) (0.397) (0.305) 
GOV -0.629* -0.315 0.312*** -0.501** -0.378 
 (0.306) (0.307) (0.078) (0.224) (0.260) 
GINI2     -0.278*** 
     (0.099) 
L.LS   0.632***   
   (0.034)   
_cons 0.914*** 0.952*** 0.439*** 0.780*** 0.929*** 
 (0.123) (0.134) (0.048) (0.102) (0.120) 
N 351 321 293 345 373 
r2 0.358 0.346  0.335 0.312 
r2_w 0.358 0.346  0.335 0.312 
AR(1) P 
value 
  0.012   
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AR(2) P 
value 
  0.181   
SarganP   0.323   
 
4. Conclusions and Implications 
This paper analyses the causes of China’s low labor income-share from a new factor misallocation 
perspective. By constructing a theoretic model, we recognize that while the capital-labor relation is 
substitutable, the deepening of capital will reduce the share of labor income. This conclusion holds for 
both fully competitive markets (free movement of factors) and imperfectly competitive markets 
(elements of market segmentation). When the relation of capital-labor is substitutable, factor 
misallocation caused by market segmentation will reduce the labor income share. This novel 
contribution will enrich the study of the existing literature on labor income-share. 
Provincial panel data from 2001 to 2013 show that Chinese capital-labor substitution elasticity is 
significantly greater than 1, indicating that capital-labor relations are alternative rather than 
substitutable. Furthermore, conducting the factor misallocation coefficient of provincial panel data 
from 2001 to 2013, empirical results also indicate that the factor misallocation has a significant 
negative impact on labor’s income-share. In addition, human capital, government spending and the 
ratio of capital-output all have significant negative impacts on labor’s income-share. In the case of 
controlling the endogenous variable, abnormal sample points and the use of different proxy variables, 
these findings are still significant and robust. 
Overall, when the current relationship of capital-labor is alternative, it would be prudent government 
economic policy to optimize factor allocation and increase labor’s share-income by enacting policies to 
remove barriers to interregional factor mobility and promoting institutional to increase levels of 
regional market integration. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Calculated according to China Statistical Yearbook data. 
Note 2. Regional nationwide presence in eastern, central and western division and the Provinces of 
market segmentation, region segmentation interior provinces, such as the regional market of the Pearl 
River Delta in Guangdong Province, eastern, western, northern Guangdong segmentation. 
Note 3. Capital and income distribution of the most common is the classic Pareto distribution, followed 
by lognormal distributions, and different conclusions unanimously. 
Note 4. GDP per capita of provincial level basically is stable to reflect the relative level of per capita 
capital stock, in general, the capital stock is a multiple of GDP (Zhang, 2004). 
Note 5. Does not include Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan; Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin of the provinces 
and each year, Tibet is missing Gini coefficient of per capita GDP data for some years. 
 
